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INSURANCE CONCEPTS OF
TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY
By JoxnN ALAN APP1AN* AND JOHN D. CusoN**
Ordinarily, disability provisions in insurance policies in-
sure against, not loss of income, but loss of capacity to work.1
It has been broadly stated that a reasonable construction should
be given to total disability clauses. 2 Other courts have more
bluntly, and perhaps more honestly, stated that a liberal con-
struction will be given them,3 even to declaring that such a
* Member, Carson & Appleman, First National Bank Building,
Urbana, Illinois. Author, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, West Pub-
lishing Company; AUTOmOBILE LIABmLiTy INSURANCE, Callaghan &
Company; various articles in law reviews and journals.
** Senior, College of Law, University of Illinois. In military
service, 1943-46. Research Assistant, Carson & Appleman, Urbana,
Illinois.
IN. H.-Bachman v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 1916, 97 A. 223, 78 N. H.
100.
Tex.-Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, Com. App. 1930,
25 S.W. 2d 1093, reversing Civ. App., 13 S.W. 2d 424.2 Iowa-Hoover v. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co., 1930, 282 N. W.
781, 225 Iowa 1034.
Tex.-Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, Com. App. 1930,
25 S.W. 2d 1093, reversing, Civ. App., 13 S.W. 2d 424; Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Hassell, Civ. App. 1933, 56
S.W. 2d 223, reversed on other grounds Hassell v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 87 S.W. 2d 468, 126 Tex. 256,
conformed to Civ. App., 93 S.W. 2d 789.
Va.-International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship-
builders, Welders and Helpers of America v. Wood, 1934, 175 S. E.
45, 162 Va. 517.
IInd.-American Liability Co. v. Bowman, 1917, 114 N.E. 992, 65
Ind. App. 109.
R. I.-Pannone v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1932, 157 A.
876.
Tex.-Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Britton, Civ. App.
1927, 292 S.W. 286.
On the other hand, it has been held that, such provisions not
being ambiguous, the rule of liberal construction had no application.
N. Y.-Perlman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1932, 254 N. Y. S.,
646, 234 App. Div. 359.
Ohio-Mosher v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 1938, 14,
N. E. 2d 413, 57 Ohio App. 435.
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construction as will indemnify the insured from loss must be
adopted. 4 New York has held that the language must be con-
strued in the light of the insured's understanding, or that the
words be interpreted as a layman would understand them.5
What constitutes total disability is not an absolute, but is a
relative matter, to be determined in the light of the insured's
occupation, education, training, and injury0 by the trier of
"Pa.-Thompson v. Citizens' Casualty Co., 1929, 94 Pa. Super.
303. 5
"The verdict of the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to re-
covery under a group insurance policy which provided that an em-
ployee who while insured thereunder 'becomes totally disabled and
will presumably thereafter during life be unable to engage in any
occupation or employment for wage or profit' is contrary to and
against the weight of the evidence where it appears that the plaintiff,
though suffering from silicosis during the period, did not know that
he was suffering therefrom, did his full work every day, except one,
during the entire period while the insurance was in force from
April 30, 1933, to June 25, 1934, was not discharged because of any
failure to do his work satisfactorily and did not consult a physician
until March, 1938, shortly after which he first learned of his condi-
tion. We must interpret the words 'total disability' as they would be
interpreted by the ordinary business man and give them the mean--
ing which they have in common thought and in common speech."
Sosknowski v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1939, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 791, 257 App.
Div. 1035.
N. Y.-Gates v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1934, 270 N. Y.
S. 282, 240 App. Div. 444, appeal dismissed 193 N. E. 296, 265 N. Y.
510; Herschman v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass.,
1936, 284 N. Y. S. 561, 158 Misc. 263, affirmed 290 N. Y. S. 425, 248
App. Div. 774; Sosknowski v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1939, 13 N. Y. S.
2d 791, 257 App. Div. 1035.
"The term 'total disability' is a relative term, depending in a
measure upon the character of the occupation and the capabilities
of the insured, and to a large extent upon the circumstances of the
particular case. Ordinarily it is a question of fact, and not of law."
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Plaster, 1924, 98 So. 909, 911, 210 Ala. 607.
Ala.-New York Life Ins. Co. v. Torrance, 1932, 141 So. 547, 224
Ala. 614.
Ark.-Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Person, 1934, 67 S. W. 2d 1007, 188
Ark. 864; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 1937, 99 S.W. 2d 254, 193
Ark. 332.
Mass.-Adamaitis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1936, 3 N. E. 2d
833, 295 Mass. 215.
Mo.-Heald v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., App.
1936, 90 S.W. 2d 797, affirmed 104 S. W. 2d 37!y, 340 Mo. 1143.
Mont.-Cacic v. Slovenska Narodna Podporna Jednota of
Chicago, Ill., 1936, 59 P. 2d 910, 102 Mont. 438.
Okla.-Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blake, 1936, 55 P. 2d 975, 176 Okla.
364.
S. C.-Thompson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.,
1935, 180 S. E. 880, 177 S. C. 120.
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facts, whether court or jury.7 Thus, total disability to carry on
the insured's present occupation may constitute total disability
for all purposes.8 The disability provision must, therefore, be
construed together with the other provisions of the contract. 9
By -"total" disability, however, is clearly meant disability
which is entire in nature as distinguished from "partial," and
the court will not construe one to cover the other.' 0 It refers
to a total loss of time," and where the specific expression
"total loss of time" is used, it will be held to mean the same as
Tenn.-Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Davis, 1935, 78 S.W.
2d 358, 18 Tenn. App. 413.
Or, as will be pointed out later, it may refer to ability or in-
ability to engage in some profitable enterprise.
N. Y.--Shabotzky v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 1939, 12 N. Y. S.
2d 848, 257 App. Div. 257, reargument denied 14 N. Y. S. 2d 279, 257
App. Div. 957.
Compare:
Tex.-Winters Mut. Aid Ass'n. Circle No. 2 v. !eddin, Com.
App. 1932, 49 S. W. 2d 1095, reversing, Civ. App. 31 S. W. 2d 1103.
Ind---American Liability Co. v. Bowman, 1917, 114 N. E. 992, 65
Ind. App. 109.
Okla.-Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blake. 1936, 55 P 2d 975, 176 Okla.364.
'Ky.-Travelers Ins. Co. v. Mahon, 1938, 117 S.W. 2d 909, 273
Ky. 691.
Similarly, a very liberal construction is given to the provision re-
quiring that the insured be disabled from performing any kind or
type of work, or from engaging in any gainful occupation.
Ky.-National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 1932, 53 S.W.
2d 701, 245 Ky. 311; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hurt, 1934,
72 S.W. 2d 20, 254 Ky. 603.
Neb.-Woods v. Central States Life Ins. Co. of St. Louis, Mo.,
1937, 271 N. W. 850, 132 Neb. 261.
'Mo.-John v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., App. 1937,
100 S.W. 2d 936.
11 Ala.-Metropoitan Life Ins. Co. v. Blue, 1931, 133 So. 707, 222
Ala. 665, 79 A. L. R. 852.
Ky.-Davis v. New England Mt. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass.,
1936, 92 S.W. 2d 822, 263 Ky. 568.
Tenn.-U. S. Stove Corporation, for Use and Benefit of Hender-
son v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1935, 84 S.W. 2d 582, 169 Tenn. 264.
But Missouri held that where the terms were not defined in the
contract, it was at liberty to apply them to the facts and is not
bound by an arbitrary classification thereof.
Mo.-Parks v. Maryland Casualty Co., 1936, 91 S. W. 2d 1186,
230 Mo. App. 383.
And, if there is an apparent conflict between the policy defi-
nitions of total and partial disability, the construction most favor-
ing the insured will be used.
Mo.-Heald v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., App. 1936,
90 S.W. 2d 797, affirmed 104 S.W. 2d 379, 340 Mo. 1143.
U Ind.-Workingmen's Mut. Protective Ass'n. v. Roos, 1916, 113
N. E. 760 63 Ind. App. 18.
Miss-Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Mathis, 1932,
142 So. 494, 169 Miss. 187.
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"total disability."' 12 And, a similar c6nstruction will be given
to the word "wholly."1 3 Total disability, when followed by
partial disability only, whether permanent or temporary, hardly
fulfills the policy requirement.' 4
In order to establish a recovery, the insured would have to
show that he is unable to engage in any remunerative occupa-
tion' 5 and this he would have to show by a preponderance of
the evidence. 16 But if his disability is such that prudence re-
quires him to desist from work or that he could not work with-
out physical injury to himself, the policy requirement is satis-
fied.17 And the mere fact that he continues to work when the
effect of such is to cause additional injury does not prevent re-
covery,18 nor would the fact that he is still able to perform some
'Miss.-Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Mathis, 1932,
142 So. 494, 169 Miss. 187.
' Tex.-State Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, Civ. App. 1932, 54 S. W. 2d
233, error dismissed.
'Ala.-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Blue, 1931, 133 s6. 707, 22
Ala. 665, 79 A. L. R. 852.
15"It has been repeatedly held in this jurisdiction that to re-
cover under policies such as those before the court plaintiff must
show his disability was such as to prevent him from engaging in any
occupation or performing work for compensation of financial value.
Finkelstein v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass.,
286 N. Y. S. 779, 247 App. Div. 74; Steingart v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 291 N. Y. S. 550, 249 App. Div. 114, affirmed 276 N. Y. 674, 13
N. E. 2d 56; Fuchs v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 253 App. Div. 665.
3 N. Y. S. 2d 707. This does not mean an insured must be utterly
helpless; the phrase is not absolute but relative. At least it means
the insured is unable to engage in a remunerative occupation, as
that phrase is ordinarily understood, or to do work in some profit-
able employment or enterprise. While the evidence in this case dis-
closed that plaintiff was suffering from a disease of the heart, it
failed to establish that such disease totally disabled him within the
definitions contained in the policies. Elenberg v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 251 App. Div. 443, 297 N. Y. S. 343, First Dept., June, 1937."
Shabotsky v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 1939, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 848, at
page 852, 257 App. Div. 257, reargument denied 14 N. Y. S. 2d 279,
257 App. Div. 957.
11 N. Y.-Schwenk v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 1939, 13
N. Y. S. 2d 611, 257 App. Div. 1012.
1 1' Miss.-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lambert, 1930, 128 So. 750,
157 Miss. 759.
N. Y.-Shahotzky v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 1939, 12 N. Y. S.
2d 848, 257 App. Div. 257, reargument denied 14 N. Y. S. 2d 279, 257
App. Div. 957.
Tex.-Kemper v. Police & Firemen's Ins. Ass'n. Com. App. 1932,
44 S. W. 2d 978, reversing Police & Firemen's Ins. Ass'n. v. Kemper,
Civ. App., 28 S.W. 2d 1111, modified Kemper v. Police & Firemen's
Ins. Ass'n., Com. App., 48 S. W. 2d 254.
' 5U. S.-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bovello, 1926, 12 F. 2d 810,
56 App. D. C. 275.
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inconsequential duties incident to his occupation. 19 On the
other hand, his wilful refusal to perform work which he is phy-
sically able to perform will not render the insurer liable,20 nor
will his voluntary quitting where disability arose subsequent to
giving up his job. 2 '.
Courts have been reluctant to abide solely by dictionary or
"GENERAL DUTIES
Insured unable to perform substantial duties of his business,
even though he may be able to perform some of the inconsequential
duties' pertaining thereto, is "disabled" within policy providing
benefits in case of disability resulting in continuous, necessary, and
total loss of all business time. Moore v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of
California, 1935, 259 N. W. 916, 128 Neb. 605.
OPERATION OF STORE
Insured becoming afflicted with tuberculosis was "totally dis-
abled" within policy authorizing recovery therefor, though able to
assist in operation of country store. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v.
Serio, 1929, 124 So. 485, 155 Miss. 515.
RETIREWMENT
Some question may arise where the insured is retired. Thus,
an accident policy insured against death or total disability resulting
from bodily injuries effected through external, violent, and acci-
dental means. The "total disability" was defined as follows: "If said.
member shall sustain bodily injuries by means, as aforesaid, which,
shall, independently of all other causes, immediately and wholly
disable and prevent him from the prosecution of any and every kind
of business pertaining to the occupation under which he receives
membership." Plaintiff stated his occupation in the contract to be
that of a "retired," the term "gentleman" or equivalent being evi-
dently omitted by clerical error, and in an action on the policy
testified that he had no occupation except to amuse himself; that
his income was derived from investments; that he had a shop at
his house, where he sometimes amused himself; and was a director
in a wagon company, and at times used some of its machinery in
connection with his amusement. While operating a buzz saw at the
wagon shops, he received a severe and painful wound on the back
of the hand, which deprived him of the use of it for some time.
Held, that the injury was not covered by the policy, as plaintiff
was not totally disabled, and prevented from any and every kind
of business pertaining to his situation. Knapp v. Preferred Mut.
Ace. Ass'n., 1889, 6 N. Y. S. 57, 53 Hun 84, 24 N. Y. St. Rep. 882, re-
hearing denied 8 N. Y. S. 946, 54 Hun 636, 26 N. Y. St. Rep. 986.
' Ala.-United States Casualty Co. v. Perryman, 1919, 82 So. 462,
203 Ala. 212.
Ind.-American Liability Co. v. Bowman, 1917, 114 N. E. 992,
65 Ind. App. 109.
'Railroad employee able to perform his work for railroad de-
spite hernia held not entitled to recover total disability benefits on
group policy, where employee quit on being informed that rail-
road intended to displace him with another man because of senior-
ity rules and that he could have his choice of two other jobs, regard-
less of any total disability arising after he ceased to be emyloyee of
railroad. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 1936, 183 S. E.
88, 52 Ga. App. 344.
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statutory definitions of the word "permanent" in applying it
to disability actions.22  Consequently they have held that it
must be construed in relation to the subject matter solely.23 As
a result, they have held that the term does not mean permanent,
unalterable, or unebarging, nor does it mean that the disability
must absolutely continue for the duration of the insured's life.24
This is particularly true where the contract provides that pay-
ments shall not be made after the termination of such dis-
ability 25 or that the condition will be presumed to be permanent
' Pa.-Garabedian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1939, 5 A. 2d
379, 135 Pa. Super. 320.
CONTRA:
The "plain, ordinary and popular" understanding of the . ad-
jective "permanent" is in accord with the definition given in
Webster's New International Dictionary (1925 Edition), as follows:
"Continuing in the same state, or without any change that destroys
form or character; remaining unaltered or unremoved; abiding;
durable; fixed; stable; lasting." Conley v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
of California, 1928, 8 Tenn. App. 405.
1 Word "permanent," as used in permanent disability clause of
life insurance policy, does not always mean forever or lasting for-
ever, but its meaning is to be construed according to its nature and
its relation to subject-matter of contract. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Milton, 1925, 127 S. E. 140, 160 Ga. 168, 40 A. L. R. 1382, answers
to certified questions conformed to 127 S. E. 798, 33 Ga. App. 634.
Also:
Ga.-Adamson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1931, 157 S. E. 104,
42 Ga. App. 587.
14 Where an insurance policy providing for total and permanent
disability benefits also provides that the insurer will "during the
continuance" of the disability, waive the payment of premiums
and will pay the insured a specified income, and that the insurer
may, at any time, have the insured examined to determine whether
or not he is totally and permanently disabled, and that, if it shall
appear that he is able to work, no further premium shall be waived
or income paid, it is not essential, to entitle the insured to receive
such benefits in case of his total and permanent disability, that he
shall establish that he will be disabled for the remainder of his
life, but, whenever it appears that the plaintiff is totally disabled
and that this disability will, as far as can be ascertained at the time,
be permanent, the insured should receive the income and have the
premiums waived from the time the fact of disability is determined
until he recovers or dies. Johnson v. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co.,
1934, 269 Ill. App. 471.
Ind.-New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass. v. Durre,
1936, 199 N. E. 868, 101 Ind. App. 467.
Md.-New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass. v. Hurst,
1938, 199 A. 822, 174 Md. 596.
Ohio-Gibbons v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1939, 21 N. E. 2d
588, 135 Ohio St. 481, affirming 23 N. E. 2d 662, 62 Ohio App. 280.
Utah-Gibson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 1934, 36 P.
2d 105, 84 Utah 452.
5Mo.-Steck v. American Nat. Assur. Co., App. 1935, 86 S. W. 2d
113.
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covery may be had where the condition is only apparently perm-
anent,2 9 or where the conditions, while indicative of permanency,
prove to be temporary only.30 Thus a distinction might be
found in results depending upon whether the term used is
"permanent" or "presumably permanent."31
Other courts, however, rather than considering the ex-
pression "permanent" to refer to a state of indefinite con-
tinuance, have considered that it refers to something incapable
of alteration, fixed, or immutable, and have, accordingly, set
up a much higher test for recovery.32 Thus, under this rule,
it must appear that the disability will probably continue for the
remainder of the insured's life.33 If recovery seems certain
Mass.-Yoffa v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1939, 23 N. E. 2d
108.
N. Y.-Ginell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1923, 200 N. Y.
S. 261, 205 App. Div. 494, affirming, 1922, 196 N. Y. S. 337, 119 Misc.
467, and reversed 143 N. E. 740, 237 N. Y. 554.
Pa.-Losnecki v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 1932, 161 A.
434, 106 Pa. Super. 259; Garabedian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
1939, 5 A. 2d 379, 135 Pa. Super. 320.
1 Pa.-Janney v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 1934, 173 A. 819, 315 Pa.
200.
HEART AND BLOOD AILMENTS
" Tenn.-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Noe, 1930, 31 S. W. 2d 689,
161 Tenn. 335.
'In disability benefit policies, there is a definite legal dis-
tinction between a coverage of permanent disability and a coverage
of presumably permanent disability. Finkelstein v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. of U. S., 1939, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 135, 256 App. Div. 593, af-
firmed 23 N. E. 2d 19, 281 N. Y. 690.
Term "presumably permanent" in group insurance certificate,
covering total disability presumably permanently preventing in-
sured from pursuing any gainful occupation for life, held not to
preclude recovery for such disability so long as any expectation
of recovery was entertained by some physicians or others familiar
with nature and extent of injury; "presumably" presupposing
facts showing probability of permanency. Gibson v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. of U. S., 1934, 36 P. 2d 105, 84 Utah 452.
1 Ky.-Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Hauser, 1937, 107 S. W.
2d 282, 269 Ky. 374.
N. J.-Gusaeff v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1937, 192 A.
528, 118 N. J. L. 364.
1 "The phrases, totally and permanently, and wholly and per-
manently, of course, have the same meaning. A total and perma-
nent disability means that the disability is of such character that
the insured has been rendered incapable of performing with reason-
able regularity any substantially gainful occupation. The word,
permanently, as used in both the policies in connection with the
character of the disability, means that such disability was based
upon a condition that rendered it reasonably certain, at the time,
that it would continue throughout the life of the insured." Culver
v. Prudential Ins. Co., Del. 1935, 179 A. 400, at page 403, 6 W. W.
Harr. 582.
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upon the expiration of a certain time,2 6 either expression im-
plying that such disability might terminate.
The common interpretation of the expression "permanent"
is, therefore, a disability which will persist for a long or in-
definite period of time,27 as distinguished from a condition
which is merely transient or temporary.28 Accordingly, re-
'Under life policy providing for payment of benefits, on due
proof of total and permanent disability continuing uninterruptedly
for period of at least three months, "during the continuance of such
disability," certain lifelong disability was not required to put into
effect the provision for disability payments, since policy implied
that disability though of permanent nature might come to an end
and that if it should end payments made were not to be repaid.
Yoffa v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Mass. 1939, 23 N. E. 2d 108.
It is not length of days, but quality of indefinite, continuous
projection in future time, that is the determinative quality of a
"permanent disability," within life policies providing for income
payments on proof that permanent total disability has existed for
90 days, and cure or recovery merely ends existence of a perma-
nent disability, which, until its expiration, remains for period of
its existence, as far as rights of parties in interest are concerned, a
"permanent disability." New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston,
Mass. v. Hurst, 1938, 199 A. 822, 174 Md. 596.
In accord:
U. S.-Clarkson v. New York Life Ins. Co., D. C. Fla. 1933, 4
F. Supp. 791.
Ohio-Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Gerwick, 1935, 197
N. E. 923, 50 Ohio App. 277.
Wyo.-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 1939, 93 P. 2d 930,
54 Wyo. 501.
I "It is also well settled law that the term 'permanent' when
used in a life insurance policy providing for disability benefits where
the insurer becomes 'totally and permanently' disabled is con-
strued to be used for the purpose only of excluding disabilities
which are merely temporary. Although the disability be one which
may or will pass away in a period of time. yet if the required period
is longer than that which, reasonably considered, is only temporary,
then it must of necessity fall within the opposite general term
'permanerit,' because it is not temporary. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society v. Serio, 155 Miss. 515, 124 So. 485; Bahneman v. Pru-
dential Insurance Company of America, 193 Minn. 26, 257 N. W.
514, 97 A. L. R. 121; Crowe v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
179 La. 444, 154 So. 52; Frey v. Manhattan Life Insurance Company,
182 La. 821, 162 So. 633." Madison v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
1938, 181 So. 871, at pages 875 and 876, 190 La. 103.
Ala.-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Blue, 1931, 133 So. 707, 22
Ala. 665, 79 A. L. R. 852.
Ky.-Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hurt, 1934, 72 S.W. 2d
20, 254 Ky. 603; Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Ovesen, 1935, 78
S. W. 2d 745, 257 Ky. 622.
La.-Madison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1938, 181 So.
871, 190 La. 103.
Me.-Plummer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1934, 169 A. 302,
132 Me. 220.
Md.-New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass. v. Hurst,
1938, 199 A. 822, 174 Md. 596.
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within a short period of time, the claim is properly one of
temporary total disability and no recovery can be had.3 4 And
this result obtains regardless of the seriousness of the injuries
at the time of their occurrence.3 5
It may be made essential that the two elements co-exist,
and where the test is total and permanent disability, neither,
standing alone, will permit a recovery.36 In construing the
Ark.-Plunkett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1936, 95 S. W. 2d
1144, 192 Ark. 1065.
Del.-Culver v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1935, 179 A.
400, 6 W. W. Harr. 582.
Ind.-Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Citizens Trust & Sav-
ings Bank of Evansville, 1935, 198 N. E. 116, 101 Ind. App. 168.
Mo.-Paul v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 1932, 52 S. W. 2d 437,
228 Mo. App. 124; Buis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1935, 77
S.W. 2d 127, 229 Mo. App. 190.
Utah.-Ralston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1937, 62 P. 2d
1119, 90 Utah 496.
New York has set up a double test, holding that insured could
not be found "permanently disabled" within contemplation of
policy unless there was evidence either that insured could never
recover or that time of recovery was so far removed that end of
disabiity could not be foreseen, and disability was found to be
such that insureaI was unable to engage in a remunerative occupa-
tion, or to do work in some profitable employment or enterprise.
Feldmann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Sup. 1939, 14 N. Y. S. 2d
652.
" N. Y.-Silverstein v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1936, 286
N. Y. S. 211, 246 App. Div. 359.
R. I.-Grenon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1932, 161 A. 229, 52
R. I. 453.
Similarly:
Under employees' group certificate providing for disability
payments if insured should become wholly and permanently unable
to perform any work during remainder of his lifetime, insured held
not entitled to recover for disability insured admitted lasted only
ten months and three days. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v.
Bond, 1936, 88 S. W. 2d 988, 261 Ky. 808.
'Injuries consisting principally of five fractures of insured's
arm were not "permanent" injuries within meaning of life policy
having disability benefits, including benefit payments and waiver
of premiums, for "permanent" and total disability, notwithstanding
that insured was totally disabled for eight months, where it had
not appeared at the time of injury that insured's condition would
be reasonably certain to continue indefinitely. Leibson v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 1939, 18 N. E. 2d 99, 297 Ill. App. 649.
1 IlI.-Supreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees of the World
v. King, 1898, 79 Ill. App. 145.
Mich.-Brod v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 1931, 235 N. W. 248, 253
Mich. 545.
Miss.--Shipp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1927, 111 So. 453,
146 Miss. 18.
N. J.-Gusaeff v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1937, 192 A.
528, 118 N. J. L. 364.
KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
terms specifically, the court will, of course, consider the con-
tract or endorsement as a whole.37
The rule, as previously stated, is to construe the provisions
favorably to the insured, and not to take a literal or strict view
of the policy requirements.38 On the other hand, the construc-
tion should not be so broad or so sweeping as to make a new
contract for the parties.30 It should, rather, reflect, if pos-
sible, the real intent of the parties based upon what the ordi-
nary layman would consider the words to mean.40
Thus, the court will look at the circumstances of the
particular case in making this determination, 41 based, at least
partly, upon the insured's occupation and capabilities. 42 Even
'N. Y.-Medlinsky v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1933, 263 N.
Y. S. 179, 146 Misc. 855.
Ky.-Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Shemweli, 1938, 116 S.W. 2d 328,
273 Ky. 264.
Mo.-Young v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1935, 84 S.W. 2d 1065,
229 Mo. App. 823, certiorari quashed State ex rel. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Allen, 1936, 100 S.W. 2d 487, 339 Mo. 1156.
R. I.-Cole v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1934, 170 A. 74, 54
i. I. 88.
Tex.-Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Curfman, Civ. App.
1939, 127 S.W. 2d 567, error dismissed.
' "We are of the opinion that the facts in this case do not war-
rant a finding that Brinkley has been totally and permanently
disabled under the provisions of this policy. While this court has
given a liberal interpretation to such provisions, these interpreta-
tions have been within the spirit and purpose of the contract. To
go further than this makes a new and different contract between
the parties, not permitted by any rule of construction." Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Brinkley, 1936, 184 S. E. 225, at page 227, 166 Va. 147.
Mass.-Rezendes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1934, 189
N. E. 826, 285 Mass. 505.
Va.-Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brinkley, 1936, 184 S. E. 225, 166 Va.
147.
" Ky.-Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Gullett, 1936, 89
S.W. 2d 1, 262 Ky. 1.
N. Y.-Medlinsky v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1933, 263 N. Y. S.
179, 146 Misc. 855.
And, respecting disability covered by accident policy, words
"wholly and continuously" held synonymous with "totally and
permanently." American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Briggs, Tex. Civ. App.
1936, 90 S.W. 2d 602, error dismissed.
"Whether specific injury or disease renders one permanently
and wholly disabled within meaning of term as used in insurance
policy is to be determined in light of nature and extent of disability
in particular case, taking into consideration a practical application
and construction of term in order to effectuate purpose of con-
tract. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brinkley, 1936, 184 S. E. 225, 166 Va. 147.
'R. I.-Cole v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1934, 170 A. 74, 54
R. I. 88.
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the physical appearance of the insured may be one of the ele-
ments entering into this consideration. 4 3
Disability is considered to be total and permanent when
it prevents the insured from following a remunerative occupa-
tion and such disability is lasting or continuous as distinguished
from temporary.44 Some few cases require the latter portion
of this definition to run for the lifetime of the insured,45 but it
is at least necessary that it be apparent that in all probability
it will continue for a long and indefinite period of time.4"
The expression "total and permanent disability" is not
construed so as to require the insured to be in a state of either
physical or mental helplessness or fopelessness in order to
establish a recovery.47 It was not the intention of the parties
'Jury or judge may look to physical appearance of claimant
and history of case, and consider lay and expert testimony in de-
termining whether insured's disability is total and permanent.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Noe, 1930, 31 S.W. 2d 689, 161 Tenn. 335.
44Ky.-Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Dismore, 1936, 88 S.W.
2d 924, 261 Ky. 741.
Tenn.-Blagg v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 1932, 15 Tenn.
App. 242.
U. S.-Starnes v. U. S., D. C. Tex. 1926, 13 F. 2d 212.
Mich.-Brod v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 1931, 235 N. W. 248, 253
Mich. 545.
N. H.-Turcotte v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1936, 182 A.
9, 87 N. H. 440.
Tenn.-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Noe, 1930, 31 S. W. 2d 689,
161 Tenn. 335.
'
3 Ky.-Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Green, 1935, 83
S.W. 2d 478, 259 Ky. 773.
Minn.-Maze v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 1933, 246 N. W.
737, 188 Minn. 139.
" " 'Total disability' does not mean utter helplessness, and
'permanent disability' does not mean utter hopelessness, and a man
to be totally and permanently disabled does not have to be re-
duced to a state wherein he is entirely dependent on others and is
absolutely without hope of improvement." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Gullett, 1936, 89 S.W. 2d 1, at page 3, 262 Ky. 1.
U. S.--Clarkson v. New York Life Ins. Co., D. C. Fla. 1933, 4 F.
Supp. 791.
Ala.-John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schroder, 1938, 180
So. 327, 235 Ala. 655.
Ark.-Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Bird, 1932, 47
S. W. 2d 812, 185 Ark. 445.
III.-Davis v. Midland Casualty Co., 1914, 190 IM. App. 338;
Kelly v. Supreme Court of Independent Order of Foresters, 1915, 195
Ill. App. 501.
Ind.-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Schneider, 1935, 193 N. E.
690, 99 Ind. App. 570.
Iowa-Kurth v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 1931, 234 N. W. 201,
211 Iowa 736.
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to confine recovery to instances of invalidism, coma, or, in-
sanity.48 Of course, if the person is actually an invalid4 9 or has
Ky-Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wyant, 1933, 61 S. W. 2d. 50, 249 Ky.
562; Bankers' Life Co. v. Green, 1935, 76 S. W. 2d 276, 256 Ky. 496;
Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., v. Gullett, 1936, 89 S. W. 2d 1,
.262 Ky. 1; Davis v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass.,
1936, 92 S. W. 2d 822, 263 Ky. 568; Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v.
Hauser, 1937, 107 S. W. 2d 282, 269 Ky. 374.
Mass.-Rezendes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1934, 189
N. E. 826, 285 Mass. 505.
Miss.-Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Serio, 1929, 124 So. 485, 155
Miss. 515.
Mo.-Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1936, 89 S. W. 2d
590, 230 Mo. App. 206; Wright v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., App.
1938, 115 S. W. 2d 102.
Neb.-McCleneghan xr London Guarantee & Accident Co., 1937,
271 N. W. 276, 132 Neb. 131; Serven v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
1937, 272 N. W. 922, 132 Neb. 637; Russell v. Glens Falls Indemnity
Co. of Glens Falls, N. Y., 1938, 279 N. W. 287, 134 Neb. 631; Schultz
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1938, 280 N. W. 165, 134 Neb.
885.
N. H.-Duhaime v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1933, 167 A.
269, 86 N. H. 307.
Pa.-Cantor v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1933, 164 A. 145, 108
Pa. Super. 1; Eisenhauer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1937, 189 A. 561,
125 Pa. Super. 403; Rudy v. New York Life Ins. Co. of New York
City, 1938, 46 Dauph. 1.
S. C.-McCutchen v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1930, 151 S. E.
67, 153 S. C. 401.
Utah-Gibson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 1934, 36 P.
2d 105, 84 Utah 452.4 U. S.-U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. McCarthy, C. C. A.
Iowa 1931, 50 F. 2d 2, certiorari denied 52 S. Ct. 32, 234 U. S. 652,
76 L. Ed. 553.
Mo.-Parks v. Maryland Casualty Co., 1936, 91 S.W. 2d 1186, 230
Mo. App. 383.
Although insanity is included, the bylaws of a fraternal bene-
fit society provided that, "whenever any member * * * shall be-
come permanently and totally disabled from pursuing the ordinary
vocations of life, * ' * he shall be entitled to receive one-half of his
certificate." One form of permanent total disability was declared
to be "insanity so adjudged by the courts." Held that, in order to
recover on a certificate of membership on the ground of insanity,
it must be such degree of insanity as would authorize an adjudica-
tion of the insured's mental status by the proper courts. Knipp
v. United Benev. Ass'n., 1907, 101 S.W. 273, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 357.
" Under an accident policy providing that, if sickness shall
totally disable and prevent insured from performing any and every
duty pertaining to any and every kind of business and occupation,
and shall necessarily confine him within the house, he was to re-
ceive a certain indemnity per month, insured was entitled to re-
ceive such indemnity, where he had been continuously confined to
his bed from July 27, 1915, to October 27, 1916, and was a helpless
invalid, paralyzed from his waist down, and unable to walk or
move from his bed, incapable of doing each and every duty or
thing appertaining to his occupation of stenographer and typist,
and would remain a helpless invalid all his life. Thompson v.
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practically lost all means of locomotion 50 a recovery may still
more easily be obtained. This is particularly true where the
combination of specific losses set forth by the contract going to
make up permanent and total disability would not, in them-
selves, reduce the insured to such a condition.Y'
Nor is it fatal that the insured may conceivably be able,
by some means, to earn some money.5 2 Absolute financial help-
lessness or incapacity to earn money need not be shown; the
usual test applied by the courts being the inability to perform
the material acts of the insured's business in substantially the
usual and customary manner.53 Other decisions, not so sweep-
General Ace., Fire & Life Assur. Corporation, Limited, of Perth,
Scotland, 1924, 98 So. 746, 155 La. 31.
And see:
Miss.-Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen v. Bunch,
1917, 76 So. 540, 115 Miss. 512, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 110.
"Charges that, if insured was able to walk with aid of canes
about his home and to his automobile and from his automobile to
his office or was able to walk with aid of canes for distance of
about 100 feet, then he was not disabled within the meaning of the
policy, were properly refused, since a state of complete helplessness
was not necessary to authorize recovery. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Schroder, 1938, 180 So. 327, 235 Ala. 655.
" A life insurance policy provision for total and permanent dis-
ability benefits, if insured were continuously and wholly prevented
for life from engaging in any occupation or performing any work
for compensation or profit was construable in light of policy pro-
vision declaring irrecoverable loss of sight of both eyes, severance
of both hands at or above wrists, or of both feet at or above ankles,
or loss of one entire hand and one entire foot a total and perma-
nent disability, and, so construed, does not require absolute help-
lessness to entitle insured to total and permanent disability bene-
fits. Wood v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 1938, 277 N. W. 241, 224 Iowa
179.
9 Ga.-Cato v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1927, 138 S. E. 787, 164 Ga.
392.
S. C.-McCutchen v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1930, 151 S. E.
67, 153 S. C. 401.
Tenn.-Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCrary, 1931, 32 S.W. 2d
1052, 161 Tenn. 389.
'Ala.-John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schroder, 1938, 180
So. 327, 235 Ala. 655.
Ark.-Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Bagley, 1934, 69
S.W. 2d 394, 188 Ark. 1009; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v.
Dowdle, 1934, 71 S.W. 2d 691, 189 Ark. 296; Equitable Life Assur.
Soc. of U. S. v. Barton, 1936, 96 S.W. 2d 480, 192 Ark. 984; Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Jones. 1936, 96 S.W. 2d 957, 192 Ark. 1106;
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 1937, 99 S.W. 2d 254, 193 Ark. 332.
Cal.-Fitzgerald v. Globe Indemnity Co. of New York, 1927,
258 P. 458, 84 Cal. App. 689.
Fla.-Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. McKeithan, 1935,
160 So. 883, 119 Fla. 486.
14 MENTuCmY LAw JouaNAi,
ingly expressed, hold that total and permanent disability exists
where insured is unable to perform any substantial part of his
work,54 or can only do work of a trifling5 5 or unimportant
Ill.-Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Copas, 1933, 265 Ill. App.
478.
Iowa-Hoover v. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co., 1939, 282 N. W. 781,
225 Iowa 1034; Eller v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 1939, 284 N. W.
406, 226 Iowa 474.
Ky.-Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Turner, 1931, 39 S.W. 2d 216, 239 Ky.
191; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cave, 1931, 40 S.W. 2d 1004,
240 Ky. 56, 79 A:. L. R. 848.
La.-Pete v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., App. 1937, 171 So. 868;
Madison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1938, 181 So. 871, 190
La. 103.
Mo.-Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., App. 1936, 90 S.W. 2d
784; Barton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., App. 1937, 103 S.W. 2d
889; Heald v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 1937, 104 S.W.
2d 379, 340 Mo. 1143, affirming, App., 90 S.W. 2d 797; Pogue v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., App. 1937, 107 S.W. 2d 144; Smith v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., App. 1937, 108 S.W. 2d 995; Rogers v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., App. 1939, 122 S.W. 2d 5.
Neb.-Bennett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1939, 287 N. W.
609, 136 Neb. 785.
S. C.-Smoak v. Southeastern Life Ins. Co., 1935, 179 S. E. 56,
175 S. C. 324.
Tenn.-Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCrary, 1931, 32 S.W. 2d
1052, 161 Tenn. 389.
Tex.-Home Ben. Ass'n. v. Springer, Civ. App. 1937, 104 S.W.
2d 172.
W. Va.-Wade v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n., 1935,
177 S. E. 611, 115 W. Va. 694; Neill v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
1938, 195 S. E. 860, 119 W. Va. 694.
4 "Total disability" is necessarily a relative matter, and must
depend chiefly on the peculiar circumstances of each case, and on
the occupation and employment and capabilities of the person in-
jured. It does not mean absolute physical disability on the part of
the insured to transact any kind of business pertaining to his occu-
pation, and may exist although the insured is able to perform oc-
casional acts, if he is unable to do any substantial portion of the
work connected with his occupation. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen v. Aday, 1911, 134 S.W. 928, 97 Ark. 425, 34
L. R. A. (N. S.) 126.
And see:
Okla.-Continental Casualty Co. v. Wynne, 1912, 129 P. 16, 36
Okla. 325; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blake, 1936, 55 P. 2d 975, 176 Okla.
364.
Thus, "total disability" within disability provisions of life
policy held not to mean absolute physical disability on part of in-
sured to transact any kind of business pertaining to his occupation,
but to exist although insured might be able to perform few occa-
sional or trivial acts relating thereto, if he was able to do any sub-
stantial portion of work connected with his occupation. New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Razzook, 1936, 61 P. 2d 686, 178 Okla. 57.
Complete physical or mental incapacity of insured held not
essential to "total disability" within supplementary contract at-
tached to life policy providing for payment of benefits for "total
and permanent disability" preventing insured from engaging in
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character.5 6 And the doing of light work at irregular intervals
would not prevent recovery.5
The insured is considered to be permanently and totally
disabled where it is impossible for him to work without hazard-
ing his health or risking his life.58 It is unnecessary for him to
do so,5 9 and if common prudence requires him to desist from
work, and he in fact does so, recovery is allowed. 60 The fact,
any occupation and performing any work for compensation or
profit, it being sufficient that disability of insured was such that it
prevented him from performing remunerative work of substantial
and not merely trifling character (G. L. Mass. (Ter. Ed.) c. 175.
§' 24). Adamaitis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1936, 3 N. E. 2d 833,
295 Mass. 215.
SKy.-Bankers' Life Co. v. Green, 1935, 76 S.W. 2d 276, 256
Ky. 496; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Kelsay, 1935, 78 S.W. 2d
923, 257 Ky. 633.
"'Pa.-Kramer v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 1934,
170 A. 700, 111 Pa. Super. 367.
" Ind.-Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Girton, 1938, 12 N. E.
2d 379, 105 Ind. App. 52.
Mass.-Rezendes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1934, 189
N. E. 826, 285 Mass. 505.
Miss.-New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bain, 1934. 152 So. 845, 169
Miss. 271.
'Under total disability clause of life policy, insurer was not
relieved from liability if insured could have continued to work
without unduly endangering his life or health, but although in-
sured may have been able to continue at work, it was unnecessary
for him to do so if common care and prudence under the circum-
stances required that he not do so. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Evans, 1938, 184 So. 426, 183 Miss. 859.
""" 'Total disability' does not mean absolute physical inability
to work at one's occupation, or to pursue some occupation for wages
or gain; but it exists if the injury or disease of the insured is such
that common care and prudence require him to desist, and he does
in fact desist, from transacting his business. In such circumstances,
total disability exists." Blackman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1934, 174
S. E. 384, 49 Ga. App. 137.
And as regards question whether insured was totaliy and
permanently disabled under policy, law does not require one to
perform duties at peril of life or health, or if performance entails
pain and suffering which persons of ordinary fortitude would be
unwilling to endure. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dowdle,
1934, 71 S.W. 2d 691, 189 Ark. 296.
In accord:
Ala.-New York Life Ins. Co. v. McLean, 1928, 118 So. 753, 218
Ala. 401.
Ark.-Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson. 1933, 54 S.W. 2d
407, 186 Ark. 519, certiorari denied 53 S. Ct. 404, 288 U. S. 609, 77 L.
Ed. 984, certiorari granted 53 S. Ct. 689 ,289 U. S. 719, 77 L. Ed.
1471, Reversed on procedural grounds Missouri State Life Ins. Co.
v. Jones, 54 S. Ct. 133, 290 U. S. 199, 78 L. Ed. 267; Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Weathersby, 1935, 82 S.W. 2d 527, 190 Ark. 1050;
Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., v. Sams, 1937, 108 S.W. 2d 1089, 194
Ark. 557.
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also, that he may have continued work for a few days without
realizing the seriousness thereof 6 ' or that he continued to work
under circumstances endangering his health would not relieve
the insurer.6
2
Cal.-Fitzgerald v. Globe Indemnity Co. of New York, 1927,
258 P. 458, 84 Cal. App. 689; Sherman v. Continental Casualty Co.,
1930, 284 P. 946, 103 Cal. App. 518.
Ga.-Cato v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1927, 138 S. E. 787, 164 Ga.
392; Blackman v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 1934, 174 S. E. 384, 49 Ga. App.
137; A. B. & C. Railroad Ben. Ass'n. v. South, 1934, 175 S. E. 924, 49
Ga. App. 659; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Baker, 1934, 176
S. E. 134, 49 Ga. App. 505; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Williamson,
1936, 184 S. E. 755, 53 Ga. App. 28; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Manufacturers Nat. Bank. 1937, 189 S. E. 83, 54 Ga. App. 771.
Ky.-Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 1936, 90 S.W. 2d 44,
262 Ky. 267.
Minn.-Lobdill v. Laboring Men's Mut. Aid Ass'n. 1897, 71
N. W. 696, 69 Minn. 14, 38 L. R. A. 537, 65 Am. St. Rep. 542.
Miss.-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lambert, 1930, 128 So. 750,
157 Miss. 759.
Mo.-Albert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., App. 1936, 95 S.W. 2d
343.
N. Y.-Collis v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 1932,
260 N. Y. S. 241, 236 App. Div. 525, affirmed 191 N. E. 507, 264 N. Y.
447.
Okla.-Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blake, 1936, 55 P. 2d 975, 176 Okla.
364.
Tex.-North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller, Civ. App.
1917, 193 S. W. 750, error refused.
Thus, insured suffering from bursitis, painfully affecting use
of right arm, and mild form of diabetes, and whose condition was
such that he was advised to refrain from performance of duties of
employment as manager and officer of corporations owning real
estate, and of construction company engaged in renovation work of
which he was active manager, held so disabled by disease as to be
prevented from performance of duties pertaining to his occupa-
tion, within coverage of health and accident policy. Klosk v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 1937, 296 N. Y. S. 5, 162 Misc. 686.
61 Tex.-Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Edwards, Civ. App.
1919, 210 S.W. 856, dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
I That insured does that which he is unable to do without great
physical pain or without endangering health or life, or that which
common prudence would require one in his condition to desist from
doing does not as a matter of law show that insured is not "totally
disabled" within disability provision of life policies. Stoner v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 1938, 114 S.W. 2d 167, 232 Mo. App. 1048.
HEART AND BLOOD AILMENTS
That insured -had discharged duties incident to his business did
not preclude recovery under fraternal beneficiary certificate for
"total disability" from high blood pressure, heart trouble, and
arteriosclerosis, where evidence showed that such activities en-
dangered insured's physical well-being. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W.,
v. Sams, 1937, 108 S. W. 2d 1089, 194 Ark. 557.
CONTRA:
Evidence that insured, suffering from nephritis and rheuma-
tism, continued work for same salary, though it was attended by
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It has been stated broadly that the court must look at the
insured's occupation as a whole in order to determine whether
or not recovery should be allowed on the ground the insured
can no longer perform his occupational duties. 3 And the policy
provision itself is to be construed together with the remaining
sections of the contract in order to make such determination. 4
In accordance with the usual rules, a liberal construction is
given for the purpose of protecting the policyholder. 5
The occupation to which such contracts refer in promising
indemnity when the insured is unable to carry on an occupation
is-the occupation which the insured was carrying on at the time
he was injured. 6 And the rule laid down by almost unanimous
authority is this: If the insured is unable to perform his
material duties pertaining to his usual and customary occupa-
tion in substantially the same manner as before, he may recover.
If he is able to do substantially all the acts material to his busi-
n'ess, and there are only a few immaterial things which he can-
not do, the rule is otherwise, but if there is any material, im-
portant, or substantial act which he cannot fulfill, recovery
munst be allowed."" And this means that the insured must be
able to do such tasks with substantial continuity.0 8
physical inconvenience, pain, and considerable danger of aggravat-
ing condition, showed as matter of law that sickness did not
"wholly disable" him within meaning of insurance policy sued on,
as word "disability" is synonymous with "incapacity." Lyle v. Re-
liance Life Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa., 1939, 124 S.W. 2d 958, 197 Ark.
737.
I Mo.-Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1938, 114 S.W. 2d 167,
232 Mo. App. 1048.
" Mo.-Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., App. 1936, 90 S.W.
2d 784.
'Mo.-Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., App. 1936, 90 S.W.
2d 784.
Tex.-Winters Mut. Aid Ass'n., Circle No. 2 v. Reddin, Civ. App.
1930, 31 S.W. 2d 1103, reversed, Com. App., 49 S.W. 2d 1095.
', Ky.-Benefit Ass'n. of Ry. Employees v. Secrest, 1931, 39 S.W.
2d 682, 239 Ky. 400.
Mo.-Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., App. 1936, 90 S.W. 2d
784; Heald v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., App. 1936, 90
S.W. 2d 797, affirmed 104 S.W. 2d 379, 340 Mo. 1143.
" "We conclude that a policy of insurance providing for the
payment of benefits when the insured has become wholly and
permanently disabled by bodily injury or disease, so that he is
and will be permanently, continuously and wholly prevented there-
by from performing any work for compensation or profit or from
following any gainful occupation, does not mean, as its literal con-
struction would require, a state of complete helplessness; but the
total disability contemplated means inability to do all the substan-
tial and material acts necessary to the prosecution of the insured's
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business or occupation in his customary and usual manner. Under
this construction of the policy, plaintiff is totally and permanently
disabled and entitled to recover the benefits provided for in the
policy." Woods v. Central States Life Ins. Co., 1937, 271 N. W.
850 at page 852, 132 Neb. 261.
"If the insured was unable either physically or mentally to
discharge the important and material duties necessary to the prose-
cution of his businesses in substantially his usual and customary
manner, he was totally disabled." Equitable Life Assurance Soc.
v. Bomar, C. C. A. Ky. 1939, 106 F. 2d 640, at page 643.
U. S.-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bovello, 1926, 12 F. 2d 810,
56 App. D. C. 275; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Bomar, C. C.
A. Ky. 1939, 106 F. 2d 640; Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit,
Mich. v. Bittle, C. C. A. Tex. 1930, 36 F. 2d 152.
Ala.-Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 1934, 153
So. 198, 228 Ala. 146.
Ark.-Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 1930, 32 S.W. 2d 310, 182
Ark. 496; Travelers' Protective Ass'n. of America v. Stephens,
1932, 49 S.W. 2d 3P4, 185 Ark. 660; Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. John-
son, 1933, 57 S.W. 2d 555, 186 Ark. 1019; American Nat. Ins. Co. of
Galveston, Tex. v. Chastain, 1934, 65 S.W. 2d 899, 188 Ark. 466;
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dowdle, 1934, 71 S.W. 2d 691,
189 Ark. 296; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Slauglhter, 1935,
79 S.W. 2d 58, 190 Ark. 402; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 1936, 96
S.W. 2d 327, 192 Ark. 860; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson. 1937, 99
S.W. 2d 254, 193 Ark. 332; Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Riddle, 1937,
101 S.W. 2d 781, 193 Ark. 572; Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Sams,
1937, 108 S.W. 2d 1089 194 Ark. 557; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Hawkins, 1938, 115 S.W. 2d 845, 195 Ark. 1099.
Fla.-Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. McKeithan, 1935,
160 So. 883, 119 Fla. 486; New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Huckins,
1937, 173 So. 696, 127 Fla. 540.
Ga.-Cato v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1927, 138 S. E. 787, 164 Ga.
392; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Tarbutton, 1932, 163 S. E. 229, 45 Ga.
App. 97; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 1932, 165 S. E. 840, 45
Ga. App. 756; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McKee, 1934. 176 S. E.
118, 49 Ga. App. 533; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Pack, 1934, 176
S. E. 119, 49 Ga. App. 535; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Baker,
1934, 176 S. E. 134, 49 Ga. App. 505; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart,
1934, 176 S. E. 777, 49 Ga. App. 786; Jefferson Standard Life Ins.
Co. v. 0liff, 1935, 178 S. E. 318, 50 Ga. App. 407; Hurst v. Federal
Life Ins. Co., 1935, 178 S. E. 762, 50 Ga. App. 900.
Iowa-Elmore v. Southern Surety Co., 1929, 224 N. W. 32, 207
Iowa 872.
Ky.-Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Logan. 1921, 229
S. W. 104, 191 Ky. 92; Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v.
Bynum, 1927, 298 S.W. 1080, 221 Ky. 450; Henderson v. Continental
Casualty Co., 1931, 39 S.W. 2d 209, 239 Ky. 93; Benefit Ass'n. of Ry.
Employees v. Secrest, 1931, 39 S.W. 2d 682, 239 Ky. 400; Columbia
Casualty Co. v. McHargue, 1933, 54 S.W. 2d 617, 246 Ky. 93; Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Wyant, 1933, 61 S.W. 2d 50, 249 Ky. 562; Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Branham, 1933, 63 S.W. 2d 498, 250 Ky.
472; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Harris, 1934. 70 S.W. 2d 949,
254 Ky. 23; Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Staggs, 1934,
75 S.W. 2d 214, 255 Ky. 638; Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v.
Hauser, 1937,.107 S.W. 2d 282, 269 Ky. 374.
La.-Crowe v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 1934, 154 So,
52, 179 La. 444; Hall v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America, App. 1936, 170 So. 516.
INSURAN CE-DISABLITY PROVISIONS
Minn.-Lobdill v. Laboring Men's Mut. Aid Ass'n., 1897, 71
N. W. 696, 69 Minn. 14, 38 L. R. A. 537, 65 Am. St. Rep. 542; Mona-
han v. Supreme Lodge of the Order of Columbian Knights, 1903,
92 N. W. 972, 88 Minn. 224; Maze v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa,
1933, 246 N. W. 737, 188 Minn. 139.
Miss.-Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Mathis, 1932,
142 So. 494, 169 Miss. 187; American Bankers' Ins. Co. v. White,
1935, 158 So. 346, 171 Miss. 677; Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Cassity,
1935, 163 So. 508, 173 Miss. 840.
Mo.-Bellows v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., Sup.
1918, 203 S.W. 978; Katz v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 1932, 44 S.W.
2d. 250, 226 Mo. App. 618; Buis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America.
1935, 77 S.W. 2d 127, 229 Mo. App. 190; Moss v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 1935, 84 S.W. 2d 395, 230 Mo. App. 70, certiorari quashed
State ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hostatter, 92 S.W. 2d
122, 338 Mo. 589, followed in 92 S.W. 2d 126; Stoner v. New York
Life Ins. Co., App. 1936, 90 S.W. 2d 784; Parks v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 1936, 91 S.W. 2d 1186, 230 Mo. App. 383; Heald v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 1937, 104 S.W. 2d 379, 340 Mo. 1143, af-
firming. App., 90 S.W. 2d 797; Wright v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
App. 1938, 115 S.W. 2d 102.
Neb.-Hamblin v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 1933,
248 N. W. 397, 124 Neb. 841; McCleneghan v. London Guarantee &
Accident Co., 1937, 271 N. W. 276, 132 Neb. 131; Woods v. Central
States Life Ins. Co. of St. Louis, Mo., 1937, 271 N. W. 850, 132 Neb.
261; Reinsch v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 1937, 274
N. W. 572, 133 Neb. 249; Russell v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. of
Glens Falls, N. Y., 1938, 279 N. W. 287, 134 Neb. 631.
N. H.-Canney v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 1937,
189 A. 168, 88 N. H. 325.
N. J.-Booth v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 1925, 130 A. 131,
3 N. J. Misc. 735.
N. M.-Bubany v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1936, 51 P. 2d 864,
39 N. M. 560.
Okla.-Ozard Mut. Life Ass'n. of Mena, Ark. v. Winchester, 1926,
243 P. 735, 116 Okla. 116; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Richter, 1935,
49 P. 2d 94, 173 Okla. 489; Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Bean,
1937, 65 P. 2d 1018, 179 Okla. 394.
Pa.-Janney v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 1934, 173 A. 819, 315
Pa. 200.
R. .-- Cole v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1934, 170 A. 74, 54
R. I. 88.
S. C.-Brown v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 1926, 134 S. E.
224, 136 S. C. 90; McCutcheon v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1930, 151
S. E. 67, 153 S. C. 401; Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1935, 180
S. E. 37, 176 S. C. 186; Owens v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 1935, 178
S. E. 125, 174 S. C. 514; Hardin v. Southeastern Life Ins. Co., 1935,
180 S. E. 210, 176 S. C. 337; Thompson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of
Hartford, Conn., 1935, 180 S. E. 880, 177 S. C. 120.
S. D.-Frazier v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 1939,
287 N. W. 589, 66 S. D. 638.
Tex.-Hefner v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, Civ.
App. 1913, 160 S.W. 330; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Joiner, Civ. App.
1915, 178 S.W. 806; North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller, Civ.
App. 1917, 193 S. W. 750, error refused; Commonwealth Bonding &
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 1922, 240 S. W. 893, 113 Tex. 21, re-
versing, Civ. App. 1916. 185 S. W. 979; Massachusetts Bonding &
Insurance Co. v. Worthy, Civ. App. 1928, 9 S. W. 2d 388, error dis-
missed; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hardeman, Civ. App. 1930,
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22 S. W. 2d 1112, error refused; Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, Com. App. 1930, 25 S. W. 2d 1093, reversing, Civ. App.
13 S. W. 2d 424; Winters Mut. Aid Ass'n, Circle No. 2 v. Reddin,
Civ. App. 1930, 31 S. W. 2d 1103, reversed, Com. App., 49 S. W. 2d
1095; Amarillo Mut. Benev. Ass'n v. Franklin, Com. App. 1932, 50
S. W. 2d 264, affirming. Civ. App., 33 S. W. 2d 859; Herold v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., Civ. App. 1935, 77 S. W. 2d 1060; Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Cox, Civ. App. 1935, 86 S. W. 2d 844.
Vt.-Clarke v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 1920, 111 A. 449, 94 Vt. 383;
Jacobs v. Loyal Protective Ins. Co., 1924, 124 A. 848, 97 Vt. 516;
Corsones v. Monarch Accident Ins. Co., 1931, 154 A. 693, 103 Vt.
379.
W. Va.-Hertzel v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California,
1929, 150 S. E. 385, 108 W. Va. 22.
DIRECT OR PERFORM
Where a mutual benefit certificate provided for the payment of
a certain indemnity if beneficiary became totally disabled so as to
be unable to "direct or perform" the kind of business or labor which
he had always followed, it was held that a beneficiary who custo-
marily performed physical labor was entitled to the indemnity on
being disabled from performing such labor though he was still able
to direct it, the provision as to "directing" having reference only to
those whose customary business consisted in giving direction. Beach
v. Supreme Tent Knights of Maccabees of the World, 1902, 77 N. Y. S.
770, 74 App. Div. 527, affirmed, 1904, 69 N. E. 281, 177 N. Y. 100.
DISABLED FROM PERFORMING ANY DUTY
Other cases would seem to allow recovery unless the insured
could do any and every duty pertaining to his occupation as before:
Ky.-National Life- & Accident Ins. Co. v. O'Brien's Ex'x., 1913,
159 S. W. 1134, 155 Ky. 498.
Mo.-Heald v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 1937, 104
S. W. 2d 379, 340 Mo. 1143, affirming, App. 90 S. W. 2d 797.
N. J.-Teitelbaum v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 1936, 184 A.
808, 116 N. J. L. 417, affirming 181 A. 395, 13 N. J. Misc. 811.
S. C.-McCutcheon v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1930, 151 S. E.
67, 153 S. C. 401.
NOT DISABLED IF PERFORMING SUBSTANTIALLY
Inability to transact some kinds or branches of business per-
taining to his occupation as merchant would not constitute total
disability within the meaning of the policy, provided he was able
to transact other kinds or branches of business pertaining substan-
tially and to a material extent to such occupation. Lobdill v. Labor-
ing Men's Mut. Aid Ass'n., 1897, 71 N. W. 696, 69 Minn. 14, 38 L. R. A.
537, 65 Am. St. Rep. 542.
NOT DISABLED IF PERFORMING ANY PORTION OF WORK
A few scattered decisions have held, also, that the insured must
be so disabled as to prevent him doing any portion of his customary
work:
Me.-Young v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 1888, 13 A. 896, 80 Me. 244.
'Pa.-Spicer v. Commercial Mut. Acc. Co., 1895, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. R.
163, 4 Pa. Dist. R. 271.
Compare also:
Ky.-Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Powers, 1934, 72 S. W.
2d 469, 254 Ky. 770.
N. J.-Doherty v. American Employers' Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass.,
1934, 169 A. 652, 112 N. J. L. 52.
INsurANCE-DIsABiLITY PROVISIONS
Even if this policy provision is so worded as to deny
benefits unless the insured is totally disabled from following
any occupation, the better rule has apparently been to hold that
this refers to any occupation from which the insured has been
accustomed to gain his livelihood, and to permit recovery pre-
cisely the same as if the clause referred to the insured's ordi-
nary vocation.0 9 There are, however, a few gleanings from the
field of jurisprudence which enforce his clause as written and
deny recovery if the insured is able to carry on any business or
" Minn.-Wilson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1933, 245 N. W.
826, 187 Minn. 462.
Thus, under a benefit certificate payable in case insured should
become "totally incapacitated to perform manual labor," total in-
capacity means inability to perform sustained manual labor, so as
to enable one to earn or assist in earning a livelihood. Grand Lodge
Locomotive Firemen v. Orrell, 1903, 69 N. E. 68, 206 Ill. 208, affirm-
ing Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Orrell, 97
Ill. App. 246.
' Ark.-Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Case, 1934, 71 S. W. 2d
199, 189 Ark. 223.
Ga.-Liner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1935, 180 S. E. 383, 50 Ga.
App. 643.
Ky.-Henderson v. Continental Casualty Co., 1931, 39 S. W. 2d
209. 239 Ky. 93; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Bond, 1935, 77
S. W. 2d 373, 257 Ky. 45.
Minn.-Lorentz v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 1936,
266 N. IV. 699, 197 Minn. 205.
Mo.-Foglesong v. Modern Brotherhood of America, 1906, 97
S. W. 240, 121 Mo. App. 548; Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., App.
1936, 90 S. W. 2d 784.
Neb.--Oswald v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 1935, 258
N. W. 41, 128 Neb. 173; Bennett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1939,
287 N. W. 609, 136 Neb. 785.
S. C.-Austell v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 1933, 170 S. E.
776, 170 S. C. 439.
Tex.-Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Curfman, Civ. App.
1939, 127 S. W. 2d 567, error dismissed.
Thus, under policy providing for disability benefits when insured
becomes totally and permanently disabled, so as to be prevented
thereby from engaging in any occupation and performing any work
for compensation or profit, insured who as result of infantile paraly-
sis was unable to continue his occupation as a barber because of
atrophy of leg and who was given temporary employment in office
as result of employer's friendship was "totally and permanently
disabled" and entitled to disability benefits. Bennett v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins, Co., 1939, 287 N. W. 609, 136 Neb. 785.
CONFINEMENT UNNECESSARY
Ala.-United States Casualty Co. v. Perryman, 1919, 82 So. 462,
203 Ala. 212.
HELPLESSNESS NOT REQUIRED
Ark.-Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Bagley, 1934, 69
S. W. 2d 394, 188 Ark. 1009.
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vocation, whether his own or another.70 Missouri, when faced
with such an argument, stated bluntly that the provisions so
construed would be invalid, and in order to give it validity, the
term any would be taken to refer to any occupation which the
insured is then carrying on, or with which he is familiar.7 1
Pennsylvania has lent some authority to tis rule, but limits the
RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION
In action on disability clause of life policies providing for
monthly payments if insured should become permanently, continu-
ously, and wholly prevented from performing work for compensa-
tion and from following any gainful occupation, instruction permit-
ting recovery if insured was disabled from carrying on occupation
in which he had been trained or employment in work of same gen-
eral character constituted error. Waldman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of New York, 1937, 399 N. Y. S. 490, 252 App. Div. 448.
Under accident policy providing for insurance for injury dis-
abling insured from performing duties pertaining to any business or
occupation, insured could not recover on showing only that injury
would incapacitate him from performing duties of his occupation.
American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Briggs, Tex. Civ. App. 1934, 70 S. W. 2d
491, error dismissed.
"Total and permanent disability" provisions of insurance poli-
cies are not limited in their application to occupation or vocation in
which insured might be engaged at time of disabilty. Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Brinkley, 1936, 184 S. E. 225, 166 Va. 147.
Insured's disability to follow occupation that he had been actual-
ly engaged in did not justify recovery under total disability clause
of life policy covering disability to pursue any occupation for wages
or profit. Jones v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 1934, 173 S. E.
259, 114 W. Va. 651.
Insured is not entitled to disability benefits because he is not
able to engage in his accustomed vocation if disability does not pre-
vent him from performing in practical manner some other and use-
ful work, but fact that he might do some light work occasionally
does not defeat right to disability payments. National Life & Accident
Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 1936, 183 S. E. 863, 117 W. Va. 61.
REGARDLESS OF FAMILIARITY WIT WORK
A policy of "accident insurance" providing for weekly payments
to the insured while totally disabled and prevented from the trans-
action of all kinds of business, should be enforced as it reads; and he
cannot recover because totally disabled for his own trade or business,
if he retains health, strength, etc., sufficient for other vocations,
whether he is conversant with such or not. Lyon v. Railway Passenger
Assur. Co., 1877, 46 Iowa 631.
OCCUPATION FOR PROFIT
In action to recover disability benefits under life policy, facts
held not to warrant finding insured was "totally disabled and thereby
prevented from engaging in occupation for profit" during disability.
Pannone v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1932, 157 A. 876, 52 R. I.
95.
IMo.-Heald v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 1937,
104 S. W. 2d 379, 340 Mo. 1143, affirming, App., 90 S. W. 2d 797.
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scope of the term any occupation to such occupations as the in-
sured is ordinarily capable of performing.72 And the decision
of a medical examiner as to such disability will be liberally con-
strued so as to afford some protection to the insured.73
It is at least necessary, among states adopting less liberal
rules than those previously discussed, that in order for the in-
surer to be excused from making disability payments, the in-
sured must be able to engage in some occupation reasonably
comparable to his present one in type of work and in remunera-
tion.7 4 In the case of the average untrained employee, disability
to follow his own occupation is equivalent to absolute inability
to follow any whatsoever75 And the mere fact that he might
be able to perform a few of the operations of some vocation at
which he had once worked will not relieve the insurer of
liability.70
The average salaried worker is not a highly trained man.
He is trained and experienced, usually, in one type of work only.
'When he is unable to do that on which he is trained to depend
for a living, he is helpless and the courts will award him a
recovery.7 7 If he is unable to perform, then, any type of work
Pa.-Cooper v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1935, 177 A. 43, 317
Pa. 405; Garver v. Prudential Ins. Co., 1937, 51 York 133 (Pa. Com.
P.); Silvano v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1939, 5 A. 2d 423, 135 Pa.
Super. 260; Harrington v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1939, 19 Wash. 180;
Kennedy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1939, 6 Schuyl. Leg. Reg. 348.
'A contract between a railroad company and an employee pro-
vided for the payment for each day of disability by reason of acci-
dent, and the regulations in connection with the relief department of
such railroad provided that the word "disability" should be held to
mean physical inability to work. Held, that the decision of a medical
examiner of such department that plaintiff, who had suffered ampu-
tation of a leg by reason of injury, was "able to work," will not be
construed to mean that plaintiff had recovered from his disability,
when the evidence shows that the examiner at the same time de-
clared plaintiff "able to do light work at present, * '* -' but he is still
disabled." Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Olson, 1903, 97 N. W. 831, 70
Neb. 559, rehearing denied, 1904, 99 N. W. 847, 70 Neb. 570.
"IN. Y.-Arico v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1934, 271 N. Y.
S. 241, 241 App. Div. 826; Robinson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of
U. S., 1935, 280 N. Y. S. 77, 155 Misc. 583.
1 Ga.-Cato v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1927, 138 S. E. 787, 164 Ga.
392.
', La.-White v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., App. 1936, 166 So.
655, rehearing denied and amended 167 So. 212.
11S. C.-Hickman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.,
1932, 164 S. E. 878, 166 S. C. 316; Durant v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1932,
164 S. E. 881, 166 S. C. 367.
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for which he may be said to be reasonably fitted, he is disabled35
And Texas has held in this connection that he is under no duty
to incur great expense to secure further education and training
to fit himself to perform other types of work.79
Persons in all walks of life may thus find themselves in-
capable of performing other tasks, and incapacity in their line
of work may render the insurer liable.
On the other hand, the insured may not be regarded as dis-
abled if he may still perform his ordinary work in the custom-
ary and usual manner.80 Or, if he may perform it "sub-
stantially," the same result is obtained. Thus, where a dancing
teacher can do every task except dancing with the pupils, re-
" Total permanent disability to perform the work of the occu-
pation followed through life, and, so far as appears, the only profit-
able occupation for which she is suited by training and experience is
the disability covered by such policies. New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Torrance, 153 So. 463, 228 Ala. 286; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Tor-
rance, 141 So. 547, 224 Ala. 614; Equitable Life Assur. Sec. v. Dor-
riety, 157 So. 59, 229 Ala. 352; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Blue, 133
So. 707, 222 Ala. 665, 79 A. L. R. 852; United States Casualty Co. v.
Perryman, 82 So. 462, 203 Ala. 212; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Plaster, 98
So. 909, 210 Ala. 607; New York Life Ins. Co. v. McLean, 118 So.
753, 218 Ala. 401. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Beaty, 1935,
162 So. 281, at page 283, 230 Ala. 638.
Neb.-From v. General American Life Ins. Co., 1937, 273 N. W.
36, 132 Neb. 731.
N. Y.-Ursaner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1933, 262 N. Y. S.
462, 146 Misc. 121.
S. C.-Brunson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1936, 188 S. E.
255, 182 S. C. 24.
' 'We do not believe it was within the contemplation of the
parties that the insured should educate himself, or go through ap-
prenticeship for another occupation and, perchance, be able to do
some occupation, thereby be able to relieve the Insurance Company
from the obligations of its contract. It is not believed that it is the
duty of the insured to equip himself, by the expense of education,
training and experience, to follow some occupation for which he was
totally unqualified at the time of the issuance of the contract of
insurance, or at the time of the sustaining of the injury. The rule of a
liberal construction of such clause of life insurance policies, as in-
volved here-that the disabilities, 'from pursuing any occupation
whatsoever for remuneration or profit'-means that if the disabili-
ties are such that the insured cannot, in the exercise of ordinary
prudence, perform substantially all of the material duties of his occu-
pation, any occupation for which he is qualified by training, educa-
tion and experience, comes within the terms of such provision." Jef-
ferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Curfman, 1939, Tex. Civ. App., 127
S. W. 2d 567, at page 572, error dismissed.
Colo.-Denton v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1937, 67 P
2d 77, 100 Colo. 293.
Ky.-Coburn v. Maryland Casualty Co., 1928, 6. S. W. 2d 471,
224 Ky. 377.
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covery has been denied.81 Or the fact that a building appraiser
occasionally must forego climbing upon a structure and hire
someone else to do so is not sufficient.8  And the fact that in-
sured has an arrested case of tuberculosis will not permit re-
covery if he continues to do his work. s 3
Where there is no ambiguity in the terms of the contract
or the tests laid down by it, neither party will be favored in
its construction.8 4 Thus, the courts will not construe two en-
tirely dissimilar expressions to have the same meaning. If a
contract refers to "engaging in any occupation or employment
for wage or profit,''s 5 it necessarily does not mean the same
as "performing any and every dnd of duty pertaining to the
insured's employment." One is general, the other limited-
the latter pertaining only to the occupation which the insured
is following at the time of the injury. Thus, it would be error
for the court to permit the jury to consider only the question as
to whether the insured, after injury, could follow his present
vocation under the general type of clauses 6
In general, total disability is not considered to exist if the
insured can follow any remunerative occupation, whether his
present vocation or another,87 especially where a general type
Ga.-Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 1931, 160 S. E. 533, 43 Ga.
App. 840.
"Appraiser of buildings and construction whose work was made
more difficult by incurable varicose ulcer of right leg which im-
paired his ability to climb in inspection of buildings requiring that
third person be hired to do necessary climbing on some occasions
held not "wholly prevented for life from engaging in any occupation
or employment for wage or profit" within coverage of policy. Jersey
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1937, 294 N. Y. S. 938, 163 Misc, 25, affirmed
294 N. Y. S. 940, 250 App. Div. 768.
' Ark-Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Person, 1934, 67 S. W. 2d 1007, 188
Ark. 864. Tuberculosis is usually considered to constitute total and
permanent disability: Miss.-Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Serio,
1929, 124 So. 485, 155 Miss. 515.
' 1ll.-Sibley v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 1935, 275
Ill. App. 323.
Tex.-Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cox, Civ. App. 1935, 86 S. W. 2d
844.
"Ohio-Mosher v.,Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 1938, 14
N. E. 2d 413, 57 Ohio App. 435.
Tenn.-Wray v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1936, 91 S. W. 2d
577, 19 Tenn. App. 533.
W. Va.-Frazee v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1938, 196 S. E. 556,
120 W. Va. 81.
I N. Y.-Jersey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1938, 294 N. Y. S. 938, 163
Misc. 25, affirmed 294 N. Y. S. 940, 250 App. Div. 768.
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of clause is used as that just indicated "so as to be prevented
thereby from engaging in any occupation and performing any
work for compensation or profit."8 8  This rule is not applied,
however, without qualification. In construing what constitutes
total disability, the courts have held that the insured can only
be expected to follow occupations for which his age, health,
training, and experience have fitted him and for which he is
reasonably qualified.8 9 And this result is the same under the
general type of clause previously discussed.90
N. C.-Thigpen v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 1933, 168
S. E. 845, 204 N. C. 551; Misskelley v. Home Life Ins. Co., 1934, 171
S. E. 862, 205 N. C. 496.
Ore.-Fagerlie v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1929, 278 P. 104, 129
Ore. 485.
R. I.-Pannone v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1932, 157 A.
876, 52 R. I. 95.
W. Va.-Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1934, 171 S. E.
824, 114 W. Va. 323.
'Del.-Culver v. Prudential Ins..Co. of America, 1935, 179 A.
400, 6 W. W. Harr, 582.
Ill.-Buffo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1935, 277 Ill. App. 366.
Utah-Colovos v. Home Life Ins. Co. of New York, 1934, 28 P.
2d 607, 83 Utah 401.
. ' "We think the narrow rule contended for by defendant, and
seemingly supported by some foreign authorities, is not in harmony
with the rule in Missouri, and in the majority of the states of this
country. We shall not write at length setting out what various opin-
ions have held under the different facts, but we have reached the
conclusion, after reading many cases, that the general holdings
under facts similar to these and under contracts worded similar to
the one under consideration here, are that the insured is totally
and permanently disabled, so as to bring him within the provisions
of the policy, when he is no longer able to perform the usual, cus-
tomary, and substantial duties of his own occupation, and when,
in view of the insured's age, training, experience, education, and
physical condition, there is no work or occupation in which he can
engage for profit." Kane v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1934, 73
S. W. 2d 826, at page 829, 228 Mo. App. 649, quashal of opinion denied
85 S. W. 2d 469, 337 Mo. 525.
Ala.-Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 1935, 161 So. 256, 230
Ala. 338; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Davis, 1935, 164 So.
86, 231 Ala. 261.
Ga.--Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Manufacturers Nat. Bank,
1937, 189 S. E. 83, 54 Ga. App. 771; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
McDevitt, 1937, 190 S. E. 404, 55 Ga. App. 342.
Kan.-Maresh v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 1931, 299 P. 934, 133 Kan.
191, rehearing denied 3 P. 2d 634, 133 Kan. 654.
Mo.-Katz v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 1932, 44 S. W. 2d 250,
226 Mo. App. 618; Kane v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1934, 73 S. W.
2d 826, 228 Mo. App. 649, quashal of opinion denied State ex rel.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 85 S. W. 2d 469, 337 Mo. 525;
Buis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1935, 77 S. W. 2d 127, 229
Mo. App. 190.
INSUTANCE-D ISAB1LITY PROVISIONS
Pa.-Amrovcik v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1935, 180 A. 727,
119 Pa. Super. 176.
S. C.-Harman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1937, 192 S. E. 878,
184 S. C. 461.
Tenn.-Principi v. Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1935, 84 S. W.
2d 587, 169 Tenn. 276.
Wash.-Storwick v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 1929, 275 P. 550, 151
Wash. 153.
GRouP LiFE INSURANCE
Ala.-Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Hale, 1935, 161 So. 248, 230 Ala.
323.
Fla.-Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Wiggins, 1934, 155
So. 327, 115 Fla. 136.
Ky.-Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Gullett, 1936, 89
S. W. 2d 1, 262 Ky. 1.
N. Y-Williams v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1935, 283
N. Y. S. 87, 245 App. Div. 585, reversing 277 N. Y. S. 429, 154 Misc.
504, and reargument denied 285 N. Y. S. 840, 246 App. Div. 891.
' "That the parties to the policy here involved intended that the
disability covered involved a consideration of the insured's capa-
bilities and experience is deducible from the word 'pursuing.' For
certainly to 'pursue' an occupation presupposes present ability and
experience to carry on such occupation. We cannot assume that it
was contemplated that plaintiff, an uneducated man, should be dis-
qualified from receiving the benefits of his policy because he might,
with his present disabilities, but with training and study at some
future date, pursue the professon of law or medicine or become a
banker." Gibson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 1934, 36 P. 2d 105,
at page 110, 84 Utah 452.
Ga.-Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Snow, 1935, 180 S. E.
241, 51 Ga. App. 280; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 1938, 196
S. E. 81, 57 Ga. App. 725.
Ind.-Indiana Life Endowment Co. v. Reed, 1913, 103 N. E. 77,
54 Ind. App. 450.
Ky.-Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Harris, 1934, 70 S. W. 2d
949, 254 Ky. 23.
Mo.-McMahon v. Supreme Council Order of Chosen Friends,
1893, 54 Mo. App. 468.
N. J.-Kordulak v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1937, 190 A.
325, 15 N. J. Misc. 242.
N. Y.-Waldman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 1937, 299
N. Y. S. 490, 252 App. Div. 448.
GROUP CERTIFICATES
Tenn.-Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Davis, 1935, 78 S. W. 2d
358, 18 Tenn. App. 413.
Tex.-Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cox, Civ. App. 1935, 86 S. W. 2d 844.
Utah--Gibson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 1934, 36 P.
2d 105, 84 Utah 452.
CONTRA:
"Total and permanent disability" under group life policy pro-
viding for "total and permanent disability" benefits did not neces-
sarily mean that insured must be bedridden, but meant inability to
do any substantial work for compensation or profit without injury
to health, irrespective of whether work was within insured's training
or experience. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Foster, C. C. A. Ga.
1933, 67 F. 2d 264.
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The insured, if idle, however, must show that he has made
an effort to adapt himself to other work and that his health
will not permit, where the contract prohibits recovery if he can
follow other occupations for gain or profit. 91 And the insurer
will not be held liable if the evidence shows clearly that the in-
sured has made no effort to secure other employment. 92
Such terms as "compensation," "gain," or "profit" refer
to remuneration received in return for labor performed or gain
received in the conduct of a business. 93 If the insured's capacity
to work and ability to earn has been reduced far below normal,
the court will not take such a strict construction of these ex-
pressions as to deny him recovery.94 Ordinarily, if gainful
work cannot be performed, total disability is established, 95 and
such work must be profitable and advantageous to the insured,
rather than some trivial work which would yield only an incon-
sequential emolument.9 6 California and North Carolina have
This result would no longer be reached by a federal court sitting
in Georgia since it is bound to follow the decisions of the state court.
Under accident policy requiring payments so long as insured
was unable to do any kind of work, the liability ceased when insured
became able to do any work to which he was fitted, though light,
and not such as he had been doing. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Ten-
nessee v. Jones, 1917, 73 So. 566, 112 Miss. 506.
Md.-Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Brookman, 1935, 175
A. 838, 167 Md. 616.
" Insurer held not liable under permanent total disability pro-
vision of life policy, providing for benefits if insured should be
"prevented from performing any work or conducting any business
for compensation or profit" where insuredwas discharged as teacher
because of impaired hearing, but evidence failed to disclose that
insured had been unable, because of impaired hearing, to obtain
other employment. White v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1936, 185 S. E. 236,
117 W. Va. 214.
'Kan.-Maresh v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 1931, 299 P. 934, 133
Kan. 191, rehearing denied 3 P. 2d 634, 133 Kan. 654.
" N. Y.-Williams v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1935, 283
N. Y. S. 87, 245 App. Div. 585, reversing 277 N. Y. S. 429, 154 Misc.
504, and reargument denied 285 N. Y. S. 840, 246 App. Div. 891.
Thus, a small farmer and peddler unable to do substantially all
necessary farm labor and to handle bags of produce could not conduct
farming or peddling for "compensation or profit" within terms of
policy. Colovos v. Home Life Ins. Co. of New York, 1934, 28 P. 2d
607, 83 Utah 401.
And "permanent total disability" need not wholly prevent in-
sured from performing any gainful work. McCutchen v. Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1930, 151 S. E. 67, 153 S. C. 401.
LACK OF CONTINUITY
To recover "total and permanent disability" benefits under
policy defining total disability as impairment of mind or body con-
tinuously rendering it impossible for insured to follow gainful occu-
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held to the contrary, however, in stating that the insured is not
entitled to benefits for any time during which he attends to any
business, whether profitable or not.97 Such would seem to be a
far less liberal and a somewhat unsound rule.
The term relative to engaging in any occupation for profit
or gain, if enforced unrestrictedly, is generally considered to
place undue limitations upon the construction of the contract. 9
It may be construed, rather, to mean the inability to perform
the acts customary to the pursuit of the insured's own business
in a substantial manner 99 or his engaging in related vocations or
work for which he is reasonably well fitted.1 00
pation, insured must establish only disability continuously rendering
it impossible for him to follow gainful occupation, and total disabil-
ity to perform any sort of labor or service was not necessary; "gain-
ful" meaning profitable, advantageous, or lucrative. Smith v. Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. of New York, La. App. 1936, 165 So. 498.
ODD JOBS
'Engaging in gainful occupation" within meaning of disability
policy is ability of insured to work with reasonable continuity in his
usual occupation or in such occupation as he is qualified physically
and mentally, under all circumstances, to perform substantially the
reasonable and essential duties incident thereto, rather than ability
to do odd jobs of comparatively trifling nature. Leonard v. Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, 1937, 193 S. E. 166, 212 N. C. 151.
GROUP POLICY
A person may be able to do some work along lines in which he is
qualified, and receive remuneration therefor, without forfeiting bene-
fits under a group policy which prescribes a condition of "total" or
"whole" disability. Woodrow v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1938, 1 A. 2d
447, 121 N. J. L. 170.
1 Cal.-Martin v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 1939, 87 P. 2d 897,
31 Cal. App. 2d 329.
N. C.-Lee v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1924, 125 S. E. 186, 188
N. C. 538.
'" Tex.--Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Curfman, Civ. App.
1939, 127 S. W. 2d 567, error.dismissed.
"S. D.-Hale v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1937, 273 N. W. 657,
65 S. D. 314.
1
"LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
Where one provision of accident policy obligated insurer to make
weekly payments for period not exceeding 52 weeks where insured
was disabled from performing any duties pertaining to occupation
in which he was engaged at time of accident, following provision
requiring insurer to make payments after expiration of 52-week
period in event insured was disabled from "engaging in any and
every occupation" was to be reasonably and practically applied to
determination of whether insured was capable of engaging in ordi-
nary forms of employment apart from that in which he was engaged
when accident occurred. Muzio v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1937,
291 N. Y. S. 955, 249 App. Div. 177.
KENTUCKY Liw JouRiNIL
The insurer may not avoid liability upon the ground there
is a mere possibility that by education or otherwise the insured
might be able in the future to earn a living by some means
presently unavailable.1 01  And where a woman has followed one
vocation all her life and is manifestly unfitted for any other,
recovery almost certainly would be allowed °102
.Nor is it sufficient that the insured is able to do some mere-
ly temporary work. The policy condition means, rather, that
the insured must be able to do gainful work with reasonable
regularity and continuity.1 03 Some courts have allowed re-
In action on policy providing for benefits if insured were "dis-
abled from engaging in any gainful occupation, or from performing
any work, or from conducting any business for compensation or pro-
fit," instruction that such provision meant inability to do substantial
portion of usual tasks of workman in such manner as to procure
and retain employment held not error, since literal construction
would not be adopted where it would provide only negligible, if any,
insurance. Home Ben. Ass'n v. Springer, Tex. Civ. App. 1937, 104
S. W. 2d 172.
FARMER
"Total and permanent disability" within life policy provision
for monthly payments in event insured by reason of injury or dis-
ease should become wholly and continuously disabled from pursu-
ing any occupation for remuneration or profit was to be construed as
providing for payment if disability rendered insured substantially
unable, in exercise of ordinary care, to perform substantial part of
work pertaining to his farming occupation, or any occupation which,
by education, training, or experience, he, since injury, in exercise
of prudence, could have done, and could do in the future. Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Curfman, Tex.-Civ. App. 1939, 127 S. W. 2d
567, error dismissed.0 Mo.-Bus v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1935, 77 S. W. 2d
127, 229 Mo. App. 190.
' The deafness of insured, who was a 50-year old woman with an
eighth grade education who had never engaged in any business other
than that of a beauty shop operator, entitled her to total and per-
manent disability benefits under life policy defining total disability
as impairment of mind or body rendering it impossible for insured
to follow a gainful occupation. Harms v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
New York, Mo. App. 1939, 127 S. W. 2d 57.
-"The court, over objection, permitted a witness to testify
that it was more difficult now, on account of the depression, to get
plaintiff a job of any kind than it was four or five years ago. This
evidence came out on cross-examination of defendant's witness. It
was not thereafter referred to. No motion was made to strike it out.
The evidence was objected to as immaterial. It should have been
excluded, but the court clearly charged the jury that, in order to re-
cover, plaintiff must show such impairment of capacity 'as to render
it impossible * * * to follow continuously any substantial gainful oc-
cupation; or in other words, the existence of total and permanent
disability so as.to prevent the plaintiff from engaging in any occu-
pation and performing any work for compensation or profit must
mean any occupation similar to that in which he was ordinarily en-
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covery where it was shown that the. insnred could do other
work. 10 4  Afore particularly, recovery has been allowed where
the nature of the tasks which insured could perform are of a
noncompensatory nature.10 5
As previously discussed, a policyholder is not obligated to
work when such labor would subject him to intense pain and
discomfort and seriously endanger his health. Conversely, it
has been held that his efforts to work under these circumstances,
even though it is shown that he did receive certain payments
therefor, will not arbitrarily deprive him of right to disability
payments.' 00 And the simple fact of his return to work, where
gaged before the accident, or for which he may be capable of fitting
himself within a reasonable time. If the disability prevents the in-
sured, the plaintiff, from performing the essential parts of such an
occupation with substantial continuity, it should entitle him to the
amount provided for in the policy.' This was the issue submitted
to the jury, and the evidence objected to cannot be held to have
been prejudicial." Wilson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1932, 245
N. W. 826, at page 829, 1887 Minn. 462.
Del.-Culver v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1935, 179 A. 400,
6 W. W. Harr. 582.
Mass.-Rezendes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1934, 189
N. E. 826, 285 Mass. 505.
Minn.-Wilson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1933, 245 N. W.
826, 187 Minn. 462.
"Ky.-Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Fannin, 1932, 53
S. IV. 2d 703, 245 Ky. 474.
S. D.-Cass v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, 1934, 253
N. W. 622, 62 S. D. 502, followed in 256 N. W. 120, 63 S. D. 23.
CONTRA:
Ga.-Parten v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 1923, 117 S. E.
772, 30 Ga. App. 245.
"'Disability of the insured to follow a gainful occupation, within
the meaning of the permanent disability clause of a life policy, is
not negatived merely by the facts that the insured can drive a car for
a short distance and can sit in a chair and whittle. Wood v. Pruden-'
tial Ins. Co. of America, 1933, 271 m. App. 103.
" "Evidence tended to show the insured to be a negro laborer,
57 years of age, employed as a coal miner, taken out of the mines in
the spring of 1931 because of disability, and put to light outdoor
work, clean-up work, cutting weeds, removing litter, etc., and finally
laid off June 24, 1931; that later he was assigned to CWA work re-
lief, where his duties were 'toting water.' Further testimony
tended to show such work was performed intermittently with pain
and exhaustion, with continuing rales, symptoms of asthma. Com-
petent medical authority reported total disability as per the com-
plaint in the fall of 1932. There was conflict in professional opinion
as to his condition, some on examinations at different periods, and
some conflict as to condition about the time of the trial.
IKENucKc LAW JouRNAL
"The mere fact that, when not suffering an acute attack of
asthma, he could and did, up to the time of trial, perform some such
work, would not justify an affirmative instruction for defendant. If
work is accompanied by suffering, aggravation of a chronic disease,
in such sort that sound medical advice says not to work, the fact
that there is still strength t9 do it at times, and, under stress of cir-
cumstances he do~s so perform, will not defeat his right to the total
permanent disability, benefit under stipulations here presented."
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Watts, 1935, 160 So. 713, at page 714, 230
Ala. 297.
U. S.-Clarson v. New York Life Ins. Co., D. C. Fla. 1933, 4 F.
Supp. 791.
Ala.-United States Casualty Co. v. Perryman, 1919, 82 So. 462,
203 Ala. 212; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Watts, 1935, 160
So. 713, 230 Ala. 297.
Cal.-Fitzgerald v. Globe Indemnity Co. of New York, 1927,
258 P. 458, 84 Cal. App. 689.
Ind.-Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Martin, 1935, 196 N. E.
125, 101 Ind. App. 320.
Mo.-McMahon v. Supreme Council Order of Chosen Friends,
1893, 54 Mo. App. 468; Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., App.
1937, 108 S. W. 2d 995; Wright v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., App.
1938, 115 S. W. 2d 102.
RAILROAD CONDUCTOR
Railroad conductor suffering loss of leg and spinal injuries, who
had insufficient education to do clerical work, and could not under-
take work requiring physical exertion, held "totally and permanently
disabled" so as to be entitled to recover disability benefits under
group life policy, notwithstanding his employment as crossing flag-
man, which was attended with pain and was imprudent, and was
given to insured because of consideration for his condition rather
than because of his ability to work. Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Wal-
lace, 1935, 161 So. 256, 230 Ala. 338.
FARMER AND STORE MANAGER
Insured who, though handicapped by loss of leg, operated plan-
tation store and superintended farming activities, and who was
afflicted with hardening of arteries, high blood pressure and en-
largement of heart, mainly super-induced by chronic Bright's dis-
ease which would probably hasten death, especially if insured con-
tinued his regular work, properly recovered on life policy, notwith-
standing policy purported to require "total and permanent disability,"
preventing insured from pursuing any occupation whatever for pro-
fit, as against contention that recovery should not exceed amount
accrued to date of judgment. Cates v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins.
Co., La. App. 1935, 159 So. 168.
SALESWORK AFTER INJURY
That insured who had suffered a paralytic stroke had for about
one month attempted to sell an article on a house-to-house canvass
basis held not to establish, contrary to testimony of medical experts
and others, that insured had not been "totally disabled" continu-
ously within disability clause of life policy, especially where at-
tempt resulted in his being thereafter confined to bed. Frey v. Great
Southern Life Ins. Co., La. App. 1936, 167 So. 480.
LIGHT WORK
Where life policy provided for disability benefits if insured be-
came wholly, continuously, and permanently unable to engage in
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conditions show that his ailments grow progressively worse, will
not bar a recovery.' 07
Accordingly, the mere fact that the insured attempted for
a time to continue to do his work will not avail the insurer,
whether the insured, at the time of so working, knew of his dis-
ability or not.10 8 This has been held even where the insured
worked until the day he was laid off.10 9
Similarly, the mere fact that the insured did do work of
some character for financial gain is not conclusive as to his
inability to recover. 110
any occupation for profit, that insured would at times be able to
beg, pick rags, or sell peanuts, or for brief periods do work necessar-
ily resulting in great pain or loss of life, would not prevent recovery
of disability benefits. Janney v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 1934, 173 A.
819, 315 Pa. 200.
ODD JOBS
A man recovering from an illness of about three weeks' duration
may justly be deemed to be "incapable of working," within the
meaning of a by-law of a mutual benefit association giving to per-
sons so disabled a certain benefit, although, by unreasonable, ex-
cessive, and harmful effort and exertion, he succeeds in doing light
work for two consecutive days, and then by reason thereof suffers
a relapse, and the fact that he receives wages for those two days is
immaterial. Genest v. L'Union St. Joseph, 1886, 6 N. E. 380, 141 Mass.
417.
" In action for indemnity under policy requiring that injury
incapacitate insured from date of accident from performing any and
every kind of duty of his occupation, right hemiplegia, accompanied
by aphasia, caused by a lesion of the brain due to concussion as re-
sult of a fall, held to warrant total recovery, notwithstanding in-
sured returned to work after accident, but complained of headaches
and inability to see, and condition resulting in entire inability to
work developed gradually. Booth v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
1925, 130 A. 131, 3 N. J. Misc. 735.
1" Ga.-Marchant v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1930, 155 S. E. 221,
42 Ga. App. 11; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McKee, 1934, 176 S. E.
118, 49 Ga. App. 533.
Ky.-Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Kelsay, 1935, 78 S. W. 2d.
923, 257 Ky. 633.
N. H.-Duhaime v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1933, 167 A.
269, 86 N. H. 307.
" That insured actually worked for remuneration until day he
was laid off did not bar recovery under disability clause of group
policy, notwithstanding policy defined a totally and permanently
disabled employee as one who had become, while insured, perma-
nently, continuously, and wholly prevented, as result of bodily in-
juries suffered, or disease contracted, from performing any work for
compensation or profit. Young v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1935, 84
S. W. 2d 1065, 229 Mo. App. 823, certiorari quashed State ex rel.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 100 S. W. 2d 487.
u" IN GENERAL
Disability payments under life policy became due when insured
became unable to work or obtain wages, irrespective of whether in-
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This is true whether the insured works along the lines of
his regular vocation or some other type of work with which he is
familiar.'1 '
sured actually engaged in occupation. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of
California v. Ringold, C. C. A. Miss. 1931, 47 F. 2d 738.
In action on accident policy, that the insured undertook to re-
turn to work and was able to perform a part of his duties and draw
full salary therefor held not to preclude recovery of benefits, since
insured was merely attempting to minimize liability of insurer. Mann
v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 1935, 179 S. E. 796, 196 S. C. 198.Insured's endeavor to work when disabled held not to preclude
right to recover total and permanent disability benefits under life
policy. Millis v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 1931, 298 P. 739, 162 Wash.
555.
FARMER
The fact that insured was physically able to perform some labor,
though handicapped with pain and disability from loss of use of
foot, would not negative "total and permanent disability" within pro-
vision in life policy for monthly payments in event insured by reason
of injury or disease should become wholly and continuously disabled
from pursuing any occupation for remuneration or profit. Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Curfman, Tex. Civ. App. 1939, 127 S. W.
2d 567, error dismissed.
MECHANIC
Where insured, prior to injuries to hip, back, and leg in auto-
mobile accident, was mechanic whose duties required manual or
muscular labor, and injuries incapacitated him from pursuing his
regular occupation upon which he was dependent for livelihood, in-
sured was "totally disabled" within group accident and health policy,
notwithstanding insured attempted unsuccessfully to pursue usual
occupation and to engage in other work. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. McKee, 1934, 176 S. E. 118, 49 Ga. App. 533.
RAILROAD SHOP WORK
That insured could engage in light work in railroad shop before
expiration of disability policy held not conclusive against total and
permanent disability. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dupins, 1934, 66
S. W. 2d 284, 188 Ark. 450.
tm U. S.-Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California v. Ringold, C. C.
A. Miss., 1931, 47 F. 2d 738.
Fla.-New York Life Ins. Co. v. Lecks, 1936, 165 So. 50, 122 Fla.
127.
N. J-Woodrow v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1938, 1 A. 2d 447, 121 N.
J. L. 170.
Tenn.-Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCrary, 1931, 32 S. W. 2d
1052, 161 Tenn. 389.
Tex.-Great Southern Life Ins. C6. v. Johnson, Com. App. 1930,
25 S. W. 2d 1093, reversing, Civ. App., 13 S. W. 2d 424.
ATTEMPTS UNSUCCESSFUL
This is more soundly sustained where his attempt to work
proved indiscreet and he was not able to continue. United States
Casualty Co. v. Perryman, 1919, 82 So. 462, 203 Ala. 212.
Mo.-Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1936, 89 S. W. 2d
590, 230 Mo. App. 206.
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On the other hand, recovery has been denied where the in-
sured did not stop working because of his claimed disability,11 2
or where he had returned to his old employment and was draw-
ing the same wages. 113 Even though he worked only part time
during the period of disability claimed, if he received the same
earnings, recovery has been denied. 1 4 Nor does mere incon-
venience in working affect the case where the life or health of
the insured is not endangered thereby. 1 5
Recovery has also not been permitted where the insured is
working a substantial part of each day, though not to the same
extent nor at the same total wages as before." 6  Similarly, if
' Ga.-Blackman v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 1934, 174 S. E. 384, 49
Ga. App. 137.
Thus, a store fixture salesman who became totally deaf but who
according to some testimony still actively engaged in work around
store which he had previously owned was not "totally and perma-
nently disabled" within meaning of disability provisions of life
policy which obligated insurer to pay disability benefts only in event
that insured was prevented from engaging in any occupation and
performing any work for compensation or profit. Fuchs v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 1938, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 707, 253 App. Div. 665.
' The insured in a life policy containing a total and permanent
disability clause, providing indemnity "upon receipt of due proof of
such disability, and that it has existed continuously for 90 days,"
was not entitled to recover under such clause, notwithstanding an
actual 90-day disability, where, at the time he presented his proof
of claim he had already returned to and was again engaged in his
usual employment, as there thus was no proof of his then being to-
tally and permanently disabled. Steffan v. Bankers' Life Co. of
Iowa, 1933, 267 Ill. App. 248.
Insured accidentally shot in leg when substantially performing
usual duties and earning same wages held not entitled to monthly
indemnity under accident policy. Provident Life & Accident Ins.
Co. of Chattanooga, Tenn. v. Harris, 1930, 28 S. W. 2d 40, 234 Ky. 358.
"' Ga.-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Stalworth, 1937, 191 S. E.
149, 55 Ga. App. 629.
Insured who regularly and continuously was engaged in cus-
tomary employment in usual manner save for some pain and slow-
ness of movement occasioned by arthritis during period in which dis-
ability was claimed, and received compensation therefor, held not
"totally and permanently disabled" within disability clause of life
policy. Stewart v. Pioneer Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 1935, 180 S. E.
889, 177 S. C. 132.
1 Insured, afflicted with tuberculosis, but continuing to work,
earning over 42 per cent of usual wages, could not recover for total
disability, under employer's group policy, though illness made con-
tinued work inadvisable, and decreased earning capacity. Cato v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1927, 138 S. E. 787, 164 Ga. 392.
Where plaintiff had his thumb injured in his work, but continued
working 9 hours a day, instead of 10, as he had previously done, at
the same rate per hour that he kad before received, he cannot re-
cover for such injuries on an accident policy conditioned that the ac-
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he works for a long period of time after injury, the evidence
may be so overpowering to the effect that the disability does
not exist as to preclude recovery. 117 Particularly is this true
where he works until the date of discharge or the expiration
date of the policy.118
And where a person engages actively in another and re-
munerative occupation, it has been stated, and wisely so, that
recovery for permanent and total disability is no longer justi-
cident must wholly and continuously disable him from performing
any and every kind of duty pertaining to his occupation. Bylow v.
Union Casualty & Surety Co., 1900, 47 A. 1066, 72 Vt. 325.
' Insured who, though unable to work regularly because of
bronchial asthma, worked in mill for nine months after contracting
illness, was not "totally and permanently disabled" within disability
provision of group policy. Lee v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S.,
1937, 189 S. E. 626, 211 N. C. 182.
An insured who had returned to work and had been gainfully
employed at his trade as a mechanic for more than 18 months prior
to claiming disability benefits was not totally disabled at time of
claim, and hence was not entitled to such benefits under life policies
providing for total and permanent disability benefits if proof was
furnished during continuance thereof. Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, R. I. 1939, 4 A. 2d 897.
Insured, who worked as laborer for city almost continuously for
107 days after leaving employment in foundry in which disability
allegedly arose, held not "totally and permanently disabled," within
group policy covering insured while engaged as foundry employee,
notwithstanding insured was on "relief list" when employed by city
and became ill on several occasions while working for city. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Krupel, 1936, 183 S. E. 241, 165 Va. 602.
"1 Beneficiary of group policy held not entitled to recover for
disability or death of insured under clause which provided benefits
if insured should become "totally and permanently disabled" or
incapacitated to extent that he was wholly, continuously, and per-
manently unable to work, where insured worked without claim of
disability until expiration date of policy, despite fact that during
life of policy insured had most of the symptoms which, as physicians
later declared, demonstrated his disability. Sanders v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 1937, 273 N. W. 286, 279 Mich. 608.
DISCHARGE FOR OTHER REASONS
That insured, after injury, worked two years and was let off
solely for conditions other than ability to work, established his
ability to work for profit. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Barela, Tex.
Civ. App. 1932, 44 S. W. 2d 494.
REDUCTION IN FORCE
Where the evidence disclosed that the plaintiff, an employee of
a silk mill, received injuries to his wrist and later was discharged
because the company was reducing the number of its employees and
the evidence further disclosed that the plaintiff had not obtained
any other work, but other than for a stiff wrist was able to work,
held that the claimant was not totally and permanently disabled
within the meaning of the provision of the policy. Blagg v. Missouri
State Life Ins. Co., 1932, 15 Tenn. ah.pp. 242.
INSURANCE-DISABLITy PRovIsIoNs
fied. 11 And if the circumstances seem to show definitely that
the insured is not disabled, recovery must be denied.120
It will be seen froin this discussion that the results in
various states are not wholly uniform. It may be concluded,
however, that the majority of the courts look to the insured's
training and experience. If the insured cannot perform his
usual occupation substantially, or perform other duties for which
he is trained and qualified, so that he sustains actual monetary
loss, indemnity will be allowed. The purpose of disability in-
surance is protection from financial loss by reason of inability
to work, and courts will not lightly permit insurance com-
panies to evade their policy obligations.
FILLING STATION
Insured who operated oil station and tire business held not
wholly disabled so as to be permanently and continuously prevented
from engaging in any occupation for remuneration or profit within
disability clause of life insurance policy. Ellis v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 1926, 106 So. 689, 214 Ala. 166.
FAR%,IER
Insured, who has ceased to do manual labor as result of disease,
but continues in active charge of his farm, managing labor, market-
ing crops, etc., with profit and remuneration to himself, and attend-
ing meetings as director of bank, would not be totally disabled for
carrying on avocation for profit or remuneration within policy in-
suring against such incapacitation. Lee v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
1924, 125 S. E. 186, 188 N. C. 538.
Insured farmer who, though unable because of stroke of paraly-
sis to continue working on farm, received $40 monthly for services as
court crier until few days before his death, held not "wholly dis-
abled" within disability clause of life policy. Thigpen v. Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co., 1933, 168 S. E. 845, 204 N. C. 551.
TEACHER
Insured who, though afflicted with tuberculosis and unable to
follow her former occupations of school teacher and proprietor of
rooming and boarding house, became charity patient in tuberculosis
hospital and received from hospital compensation equaling or ex-
ceeding her former income from teaching class of patients and sub-
sequently acting as attendant and clerk in X-ray department held
not entitled to disability benefits under life policy requiring that
total permanent disability prevent insured from performing any
work for compensation. Patey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1936, 93
S. W. 2d 1271, 19 Tenn. App. 634.
'An insured, who manifested few objective symptoms of the
mental illness for which disability benefits under life policy were
sought, who was physically active, engaged in business on behalf of
his wife during period of alleged disability, applied for additional in-
surance denying that he had been suffering from physical or mental
ill health, and applied for automobile licenses for a succession of
years during which he stated he was suffering no physical or mental
ill health, was not entitled to recover total permanent disability
benefits under life policy. Robinson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.
of U. S., 1938, 198 A. 192, 16 N. J. Mlisc. 211, affirmed 8 A. 2d 600,
126 N. J. Eq. 242.
